




INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT)

(51) International Patent Classification ⁶: H04L 9/00	A1	(11) International Publication Number: WO 97/26734 (43) International Publication Date: 24 July 1997 (24.07.97)
(21) International Application Number: PCT/US97/00666 (22) International Filing Date: 16 January 1997 (16.01.97) (30) Priority Data: 08/586,230 16 January 1996 (16.01.96) US (71) Applicant: RAPTOR SYSTEMS, INC. [US/US]; 69 Hickory Drive, Waltham, MA 02154 (US). (72) Inventors: KIRBY, Alan, J.; 17 Mendelssohn Drive, Hollis, NH 03049 (US). KRAEMER, Jeffrey, A.; 18 Treetop Circle, Northboro, MA 01532 (US). NADKARNI, Ashok, P.; 28 Keyes Road, Shrewsbury, MA 01545 (US). (74) Agent: FEIGENBAUM, David, L.; Fish & Richardson P.C., 225 Franklin Street, Boston, MA 02110-2804 (US).		(81) Designated States: AU, CA, IL, JP, European patent (AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, IE, IT, LU, MC, NL, PT, SE). Published <i>With international search report.</i> <i>Before the expiration of the time limit for amending the claims and to be republished in the event of the receipt of amendments.</i>

(54) Title: TRANSFERRING ENCRYPTED PACKETS OVER A PUBLIC NETWORK**(57) Abstract**

The invention features receiving encrypted network packets sent over a network (20) at a network interface computer (16) and passing the encrypted network packets to a computer (18) on an internal network. The invention further features receiving network packets sent over a network (20), determining which virtual tunnel (140, 142) each network packet was sent over, and routing each network packet to a destination computer in accordance with the determined virtual tunnel (140, 142).



FOR THE PURPOSES OF INFORMATION ONLY

Codes used to identify States party to the PCT on the front pages of pamphlets publishing international applications under the PCT.

AM	Armenia	GB	United Kingdom	MW	Malawi
AT	Austria	GE	Georgia	MX	Mexico
AU	Australia	GN	Guinea	NE	Niger
BB	Barbados	GR	Greece	NL	Netherlands
BE	Belgium	HU	Hungary	NO	Norway
BF	Burkina Faso	IE	Ireland	NZ	New Zealand
BG	Bulgaria	IT	Italy	PL	Poland
BJ	Benin	JP	Japan	PT	Portugal
BR	Brazil	KE	Kenya	RO	Romania
BY	Belarus	KG	Kyrgyzstan	RU	Russian Federation
CA	Canada	KP	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	SD	Sudan
CF	Central African Republic	KR	Republic of Korea	SE	Sweden
CG	Congo	KZ	Kazakhstan	SG	Singapore
CH	Switzerland	LI	Liechtenstein	SI	Slovenia
CI	Côte d'Ivoire	LK	Sri Lanka	SK	Slovakia
CM	Cameroon	LR	Liberia	SN	Senegal
CN	China	LT	Lithuania	SZ	Swaziland
CS	Czechoslovakia	LU	Luxembourg	TD	Chad
CZ	Czech Republic	LV	Latvia	TG	Togo
DE	Germany	MC	Monaco	TJ	Tajikistan
DK	Denmark	MD	Republic of Moldova	TT	Trinidad and Tobago
EE	Estonia	MG	Madagascar	UA	Ukraine
ES	Spain	ML	Mali	UG	Uganda
FI	Finland	MN	Mongolia	US	United States of America
FR	France	MR	Mauritania	UZ	Uzbekistan
GA	Gabon			VN	Viet Nam

- 1 -

TRANSFERRING ENCRYPTED
PACKETS OVER A PUBLIC NETWORK

5

Background

This invention relates to transferring encrypted packets over a public network.

Referring to Fig. 1, while executing a variety of software applications, 10, 12, 14, for example, Telnet 10 or Microsoft™, Inc. Word™ 12, computers 16 and 18 may exchange data over networks 20, 21, for example, a telephone company network, a private network, or a public network such as the internet or X.25. The applications communicate using network protocols 22, 24, 26, for example, transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) 22 or internet packet exchange (IPX) 24, through application programming interfaces 28, 30, 32. Through application programming interfaces 34, 36, 38, the network protocols communicate with network drivers 40, 42, 44 to direct network interface hardware 46, 48 to transfer data over the networks.

While on a network, data being transmitted, including the addresses of the source and destination computers 16, 18, is accessible to others who may be monitoring the network. For security, the data is often encrypted before being sent on the network.

Referring also to Fig. 2, for additional security, firewall computers 16, 18, which have direct access to a network 20 may be used to prevent unauthorized access to internal/private networks 50, 52. For example, when an internal network driver 53 within firewall computer 16 receives data from an internal computer 54 that is destined for a computer 56 on a public network, it encrypts the data and the addresses of source computer 54 and destination computer 56. Computer 16 then prepends

- 2 -

to the encrypted data a new IP header including its own address as well as the address of a destination computer, which may also be a firewall computer, e.g., computer 18.

When a firewall computer receives a network packet
5 from the network, it determines whether the transmission is authorized. If so, the computer examines the header within the packet to determine what encryption algorithm was used to encrypt the packet. Using this algorithm and a secret key, the computer decrypts the data and
10 addresses of the source and destination computers 54, 56 and sends the data to the destination computer. If both the source and destination computers are firewall computers, the only addresses visible (i.e., unencrypted) on the network are those of the firewall computers. The
15 addresses of computers on the internal networks, and, hence, the internal network topology, are hidden. This has been termed "virtual private networking" (VPN).

Encrypting/decrypting data has been performed by complex security software within applications or, to
20 simplify the applications, encrypting/decrypting has been performed within the protocol stack of network protocols.

Summary

In general, in one aspect, the invention features a method of handling network packets. Encrypted network
25 packets are received from the network at a network interface computer and passed to a computer on an internal network.

Implementations of the invention may include one or more of the following features. Before passing the
30 encrypted network packets to the computer on the internal network, the destination computer for each encrypted network packet is determined. Determining the destination computer may include determining whether a source computer that sent each encrypted network packet

- 3 -

is authorized to send encrypted network packets to the destination computer. Determining the destination computer may also include examining a field in a header of the network packet, and the field may correspond to a
5 virtual network tunnel.

An encrypted network packet may be passed to the computer on the internal network if the computer on the internal network is determined to be the destination computer. Instead, the encrypted network packet may be
10 decrypted at the network interface computer when the network interface computer is determined to be the destination computer. Network packets decrypted by the network interface computer may be passed to a computer on an internal network.

15 The method may also include encrypting network packets and sending the encrypted network packets from the network interface computer to the network. The computer on the internal network may encrypt the network packets, and the method may further include passing the
20 encrypted network packets to the network interface computer. The network interface computer may be a firewall computer, and the network may be a public network.

In general, in another aspect, the invention
25 features receiving encrypted network packets at a first computer over a network from a second computer, and examining a field in each network packet to determine which of a plurality of encryption algorithms was used to encrypt the network packet. The network packet is then
30 decrypted in accordance with the determined encryption algorithm.

Implementations of the invention may include one or more of the following features. The field may be examined to determine a destination computer for each
35 encrypted network packet. A determination may be made as

- 4 -

to whether a source computer that sent each encrypted network packet is authorized to send encrypted network packets to the destination computer. Encrypted network packets may be passed to a computer on an internal
5 network when the destination computer is determined to be the computer on the internal network. The network packets may be decrypted when the destination computer is determined to be the first computer, and the decrypted network packets may be passed to a computer on an
10 internal network. The field may correspond to a virtual network tunnel, and the network may be a public network. The first computer may be a firewall computer.

In general, in another aspect, the invention features receiving network packets over a network, and
15 determining which virtual tunnel each network packet was sent over is made. Each network packet is then routed to a destination computer in accordance with the determined virtual tunnel.

Implementations of the invention may include one
20 or more of the following features. Each network packet may be decrypted in accordance with the determined virtual tunnel.

In general, in another aspect, the invention features encrypting network packets at a computer
25 connected to an internal network and passing the network packets over the internal network to a network interface computer. The network interface computer then passes the encrypted network packets over a public network.

In general, in another aspect, the invention
30 features receiving network packets from a network, and determining over which virtual tunnel each network packet was sent. A determination is also made as to whether the source computer that sent each network packet is authorized to send network packets over the determined
35 virtual tunnel.

- 5 -

Implementations of the invention may include one or more of the following features. Each network packet may be routed to a destination computer in accordance with the determined virtual tunnel when the source
5 computer is determined to be authorized.

Advantages of the invention may include one or more of the following. Using the policy id field to create virtual tunnels allows a receiving computer to determine both a packet's encryption algorithm and where
10 the packet should be routed. Multiple tunnels between the same two computers allows packets encrypted with different encryption algorithms to be sent between the same computers. The virtual tunnels permit the encapsulating/decapsulating and encrypting/decrypting of
15 network packets to be spread across multiple computers. Using the tunnel databases, the firewall computers may restrict access to particular tunnels and, in effect, perform packet filtering for each tunnel.

Other advantages and features will become apparent
20 from the following description and from the claims.

Description

Fig. 1 is a block diagram of two computers connected together through two networks.

Fig. 2 is a block diagram of two firewall
25 computers and networks.

Fig. 3 is a block diagram of a computer including a security network driver.

Fig. 4 is a flow chart of encapsulation and encryption.

30 Figs. 5 and 6 are block diagrams of network packets.

Fig. 7 is a flow chart of decryption and decapsulation.

Fig. 8 is a block diagram of virtual tunnels.

35 Fig. 9 is a block diagram of a computer network.

- 6 -

Fig. 10 is a flow chart of tunnel record generation.

Fig. 11 is a flow chart of tunnel record updating.

As seen in Fig. 3, security network driver
5 software 72 is inserted between network protocol TCP/IP
22 and corresponding network driver 40. The security
network driver encrypts information before it is sent on
the network by the network driver and decrypts
information received from the network by the network
10 driver before the information is sent to the network
protocol. As a result, after choosing a security network
driver with the required security features, users may
freely choose among available applications and network
protocols regardless of the required level of security
15 and regardless of the available encryption/decryption
libraries and without having to compromise their security
needs. Moreover, the chosen applications and network
protocols need not be modified. To change the level of
security, the user may simply chose another security
20 network driver or modify the current security network
driver.

Generally, a computer's operating system software
defines a "road map" indicating which applications may
communicate with each other. To insert a security
25 network driver between a network protocol and a network
driver, the road map is altered. The vendor of the
operating system software may make the road map available
or the road map may be determined through observation and
testing. Once the road map is altered, functions such as
30 send and receive, between the network protocol and the
network driver are diverted to the network security
driver to encrypt data before it is sent on the network
and to decrypt data when it is received from the network.

Referring to Figs. 3 and 4, as an example, to send
35 data from computer 16 to computer 18 on the internet,

- 7 -

Telnet 10 issues (step 60) a send call to TCP/IP 22 through network protocol API 28. The send call includes a network packet 62 (Fig. 5) having a header 64 and data 66. The header includes information such as the
5 addresses of the source and destination computers and the type of application that sent the data. The network protocol then issues (step 68) a send call to the network driver API which, in accordance with the altered road map, issues (step 70) a send call to a security network
10 driver (SND) 72.

The security network driver issues (step 74) an encapsulate call to an encapsulate/decapsulate library 76 through an API 77. In one example, the encapsulate/decapsulate library uses the swIPe IP
15 Security Protocol created by J. Ioannidis of Columbia University and M. Blaze of AT&T™, Inc. which is described in an Internet Draft dated December 3, 1993 and incorporated by reference. Referring also to Fig. 6, the encapsulate call generates a new network packet 78 in
20 accordance with the swIPe protocol. The new packet includes a header 80, a swIPe protocol header 82, and data 84. According to options within the swIPe protocol, header 80 may be the original header 64 (Fig. 5), in which case, data 84 is the original data 66, or header 80
25 may be a new header including the address of a source firewall computer, e.g., computer 16 (Fig. 2), and a destination computer which may also be a firewall computer, e.g., 18. Where header 80 is a new header, data 84 includes the entire original network packet 62
30 (Fig. 5).

After encapsulating the network packet, the security network driver issues (step 88, Fig. 4) an encryption call to an encryption/decryption library 90 (Fig. 3) through an API 91. Library 90 encrypts a
35 portion 92 of the encapsulated network packet including

- 8 -

data 84 and part of swIPe protocol header 82. Header 80 (Fig. 6) is not encrypted. Thus, if, according to options within the swIPe protocol, header 80 is the original header 64 (Fig. 5), then the addresses of the source and destination computers are visible on the internet. On the other hand, if header 80 is a new header including the addresses of firewall computers, then the addresses of internal source and destination computers are encrypted and not visible on the internet.

Library 90 may be of the type sold by RSA Data Security[™], Inc. of Redwood City, California and may encrypt the data according to an RSA algorithm such as RC2 or RC4 or according to a federal information processing standard (FIPS) such as data encryption standard (DES).

The security network driver then issues (step 94) a send call, including the encapsulated/encrypted network packet, to the API, and the API, in accordance with the altered road map, issues (step 96) a send call to a network driver, e.g., network driver 40. The network driver then causes hardware 46 to transmit (step 98) the encapsulated/encrypted network packet on the network.

Referring to Figs. 3 and 7, the network drivers of each computer 16, 18 (Figs. 2 and 3) maintain a database of addresses to which they will respond. For example, when network driver 40 receives (step 100) a properly addressed network packet from network 20, the network driver issues (step 102) a receive call to corresponding network protocol API 34. In accordance with the altered road map, the API issues (step 104) a receive call to security network driver (SND) 72 which issues (step 106) an authorization call to encapsulate/decapsulate library 76 through API 77. Library 76 examines the unencrypted portion of swIPe header 82 (Fig. 6) to determine (step

- 9 -

108) whether it is proper. If it is not proper, an error (step 110) is flagged.

If the header 82 is not a swIpe header, then the security network driver issues a receive call to the API including the unaltered packet.

If the swIpe header is proper, the security network driver issues (step 112) a decryption call to encryption/decryption library 90 through API 91. A portion of the unencrypted swIpe protocol header includes a policy identification (id) field 113. The policy id field indicates the encryption algorithm used to encrypt the data. Library 90 uses a secret key that was previously exchanged between the computers and the encryption algorithm to decrypt data 84.

After decryption, the security network driver issues (step 114, Fig. 7) a digital signature check call to encapsulate/decapsulate library 76. The swIpe protocol header includes a digital signature 86. The digital signature is a unique number calculated using the data in the network packet, the secret key, and a digital signature algorithm. Library 76 recalculates the digital signature and compares (step 116) it to digital signature 86 in the network packet. If the network packet is tampered with during transmission and any data within the packet is changed, then the digital signature in the packet will not match the digital signature generated by the receiving computer and an error (step 118) will be flagged.

If the signatures match, then the security network driver issues (step 120) a receive call to the API which issues (step 121) a receive call to the TCP/IP network protocol including only the original network packet 62 (Fig. 5, data 66 and addresses of the source and destination computers 64). If (step 122) the network packet is destined for computer 16, then TCP/IP issues

- 10 -

(step 124) a receive call to an application 10, 12 and if the network packet is destined for a computer on an internal network, e.g., computer 54 (Fig. 2) on network 50, then TCP/IP issues (step 126) a receive call to
5 internal network driver 53 which then sends (step 128) the data to the internal computer.

Referring to Fig. 8, the policy id field may be used to create virtual tunnels 140, 142 between firewall computers 146, 148 on internet 152. When computer 146
10 receives a network packet, it checks the policy id to determine which "tunnel" the packet came through. The tunnel indicates the type of encryption algorithm used to encrypt the packet.

Multiple tunnels 140, 142 may connect two
15 computers 146, 148 and each tunnel may use a different encryption algorithm. For example, tunnel 140 may use the RC2 encryption algorithm from RSA Data Security™, Inc. while tunnel 142 uses the FIPS DES encryption algorithm. Because the RC2 encryption algorithm is less
20 secure and requires less computer processing time than the FIPS DES standard, users may send a larger number of network packets requiring less security over tunnel 140 as opposed to tunnel 142. Similarly, predetermined groups of users or computers may be restricted to sending
25 their packets over particular tunnels (effectively attaching a packet filter to each tunnel).

The tunnel may also indicate where the packet is to be sent. Primary firewall computers 16, 18 store information about the internal path of each tunnel in a
30 tunnel database. When computer 146 receives a packet whose policy id indicates that the packet came through a tunnel that ends at computer 146, e.g., tunnel 142, computer 146 decapsulates and decrypts the packet and sends the decrypted packet over internal network 154 to
35 the proper destination computer in accordance with the

- 11 -

decrypted destination address. When computer 146 receives a packet whose policy id indicates that it came through a tunnel that does not end with computer 146, e.g., tunnel 140, computer 146 does not decapsulate and
5 decrypt the packet. Instead, computer 146 sends the encrypted packet to internal firewall computer 158 in accordance with the tunnel database.

Internal firewall computer 158 also has a tunnel database in which the internal path of any tunnels
10 connected to computer 158 are stored. As a result, when computer 158 receives a packet whose policy id indicates that it came through a tunnel that ends with computer 158, e.g., tunnel 140, it decapsulates and decrypts the packet according to the policy id and sends the decrypted
15 packet over internal network 160 to computer 162 in accordance with the decrypted destination address.

The only addresses visible on the internet and on internal network 154 are the addresses of the firewall computers 146, 148, and 158. The address of internal
20 computer 162 and, hence, the network topology of network 160 are protected on both the internet and internal network 154.

The tunnel databases provide the firewall computers 146, 148, and 158 with information as to the
25 internal path of the tunnels. Thus, if computer 162 was another firewall computer, computer 146 may modify the destination address of packets received on tunnel 140 to be the address of computer 162 to cause computer 158 to send the packet directly to computer 162 without checking
30 the policy id field.

Encapsulating/decapsulating and encrypting/decrypting network packets may require a large portion of a computer's processing power. Creating virtual tunnels using the policy id field allows the
35 encapsulating/decapsulating and encrypting/decrypting of

- 12 -

network packets to be spread across several computers. For example, computer 146 may decapsulate and decrypt network packets destined for computers connected to internal network 154 while computer 158 may decapsulate
5 and decrypt network packets destined for computers connected to internal networks 154 and 160. Similarly, computer 146 may encapsulate and encrypt network packets sent from computers connected to internal network 154 while computer 158 may encapsulate and encrypt network
10 packets sent from computers connected to internal networks 154 and 160.

The Kerberos Key Distribution Center components of Kerberos Network Authentication System created under project Athena at Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
15 defines one method of providing computers with secret keys. Referring to Fig. 9, computer 130 is termed the "trusted" computer, and before computers 132 and 134 may transfer encrypted data to each other over network 136, both computers send a request to trusted computer 130 for
20 a secret key. For a more detailed description of the Kerberos Key Distribution Center, see RFC1510 (request for comment) "Kerberos Network Authentication Service" by J. Kohl & B. Neuman, September 10, 1993, which is incorporated by reference.

25 Referring back to Fig. 2, to transfer secure (i.e., encapsulated and/or encrypted) network packets between two computers, operators of the two computers may verbally exchange a secret key for each tunnel between the computers and then manually initialize the computers
30 to transfer data by generating a tunnel record including a secret key for each tunnel between the two computers. Firewall computers are typically managed by skilled technicians capable of generating tunnel records. Typical users have non-firewall computers and may wish to
35 transfer encapsulated/encrypted data with a firewall

- 13 -

computer. To avoid requiring that a typical user generate tunnel records and instead of having a separate trusted computer provide secret keys to two computers, a firewall computer 16, 18 may provide secret keys to other
5 computers.

Referring also to Fig. 10, when a user wishes to transfer packets between his/her computer and a firewall computer, the user requests (step 170) a password (a one-time pad) from the firewall operator. The operator then
10 generates (step 172) tunnel records for each tunnel over which the user's computer and the firewall computer may transfer network packets. The operator also stores (step 174) the password given to the user on the firewall computer. The user installs (step 176) the security
15 network driver (SND) software on his/her computer and runs (step 178) a configuration program. The configuration program prompts (step 180) the user for the password and sends (step 182) a configuration request to the firewall computer.

20 The firewall computer identifies (step 184) the user's computer as the sender of the request and notifies the user's computer of the available tunnels by sending (step 186) the complete tunnel records, including secret keys, associated with each tunnel to the user's computer.
25 The tunnel records are sent through network packets that are encrypted using the password and the encryption algorithm. Afterwards, the firewall deletes (step 188) the password, and further network packets are transmitted between the two computers through the available tunnels
30 and encrypted according to the secret key associated with each tunnel.

Referring to Fig. 11, generally, each time the user's computer accesses (step 190) the internet, a new internet address is assigned. The firewall computer
35 needs to know the new address in order to update the

- 14 -

tunnel records. To notify the firewall computer of the new internet address, each time the user's computer accesses the internet, the configuration software issues (step 192) a connect request to the firewall computer.

5 The firewall computer identifies (step 194) the computer and may prompt the user for a user name and a user password. If the user name and password are authorized (step 196), the firewall updates (step 198) the tunnel records with the internet address sent as part of the

10 connect request. The configuration software also updates (step 200) the non-firewall computer's tunnel records with the computer's new internet address.

Other embodiments are within the scope of the following claims.

15 For example, instead of encapsulating the network packets using the swIPE protocol header, other internet security algorithms may be used.

Although the security network driver was described with respect to send and receive functions, APIs from

20 different manufacturers, for example, Sun[®], Inc. and Microsoft[™], Inc., include a variety functions, and the security network driver is designed to respond to each possible function.

The security network driver may also be

25 simultaneously connected to multiple network protocols, e.g., both TCP/IP 22 and IPX 24, as shown in Fig. 3.

- 15 -

What is claimed is:

1. A method of handling network packets,
comprising:

receiving encrypted network packets from the
5 network at a network interface computer; and
passing the encrypted network packets to a
computer on an internal network.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising,
before passing the encrypted network packets to the
10 computer on the internal network:

determining a destination computer for each
encrypted network packet.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein determining
further includes:

15 determining whether a source computer that sent
each encrypted network packet is authorized to send
encrypted network packets to the destination computer.

4. The method of claim 2, wherein determining
includes:

20 examining a field in a header of the network
packet.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the field
corresponds to a virtual network tunnel.

6. The method of claim 2, wherein an encrypted
25 network packet is passed to the computer on the internal
network when the destination computer for the encrypted
network packet is determined to be the computer on the
internal network.

7. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
30 decrypting an encrypted network packet at the
network interface computer when the destination computer
for the encrypted network packet is determined to be the
network interface computer.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising:

- 16 -

passing the decrypted network packet to the computer on the internal network.

9. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
encrypting network packets; and

5 sending encrypted network packets from the network interface computer to the network.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein the computer on the internal network encrypts the network packets, and further comprising:

10 passing the encrypted network packets to the network interface computer.

11. The method of claim 1, wherein the network interface computer comprises a firewall computer.

12. The method of claim 1, wherein the network
15 comprises a public network.

13. A method of handling network packets,
comprising:

receiving encrypted network packets at a first computer over a network from a second computer;

20 examining a field in each network packet to determine which of a plurality of encryption algorithms was used to encrypt the network packet; and

decrypting the network packet in accordance with the determined encryption algorithm.

25 14. The method of claim 13, further comprising:
examining the field to determine a destination computer for each encrypted network packet.

15. The method of claim 14, further comprising:
determining whether a source computer that sent
30 each encrypted network packet is authorized to send encrypted network packets to the destination computer.

16. The method of claim 14, further comprising:
passing encrypted network packets to a computer on an internal network when the destination computer is
35 determined to be the computer on the internal network.

- 17 -

17. The method of claim 14, further comprising:
decrypting network packets when the destination
computer is determined to be the first computer.

18. The method of claim 17, further comprising:
5 passing the decrypted network packets to a
computer on an internal network.

19. The method of claim 13, wherein the field
corresponds to a virtual network tunnel.

20. The method of claim 13, wherein the network
10 comprises a public network.

21. The method of claim 13, wherein the first
computer comprises a firewall computer.

22. A method of handling network packets,
comprising:
15 receiving network packets sent over a network;
determining which virtual tunnel each network
packet was sent over; and

routing each network packet to a destination
computer in accordance with the determined virtual
20 tunnel.

23. The method of claim 22, further comprising:
decrypting each network packet in accordance with
the determined virtual tunnel.

24. A method of handling network packets,
25 comprising:

encrypting network packets at a computer connected
to an internal network;

passing the encrypted network packet over the
internal network to a public network interface computer;
30 and

passing the encrypted network packet over a public
network connected to the network interface computer.

25. A method of handling network packets,
comprising:
35 receiving network packets sent over a network;

- 18 -

determining which virtual tunnel each network packet was sent over; and

determining whether a source computer that sent each network packet is authorized to send network packets
5 to over the determined virtual tunnel.

26. The method of claim 25, further comprising:
routing each network packet to a destination computer in accordance with the determined virtual tunnel when the source computer is determined to be authorized.

1/10




FIG. 1
SUBSTITUTE SHEET (RULE 26)

2/10




FIG. 2

3/10




FIG. 3
SUBSTITUTE SHEET (RULE 26)

4/10




FIG. 4
SUBSTITUTE SHEET (RULE 26)




FIG. 5




FIG. 6

6/10




FIG. 7

SUBSTITUTE SHEET (RULE 26)

7/10




FIG. 8

8/10




FIG. 9

9/10




FIG.10

10/10




FIG. 11

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

International application No.

PCT/US97/00666

A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER

IPC(6) : Please See Extra Sheet.

US CL : 370/94.1; 94.3; 380/ 23, 30

According to International Patent Classification (IPC) or to both national classification and IPC

B. FIELDS SEARCHED

Minimum documentation searched (classification system followed by classification symbols)

U.S. : 370/94.1; 94.3; 380/ 23, 30

Documentation searched other than minimum documentation to the extent that such documents are included in the fields searched

Electronic data base consulted during the international search (name of data base and, where practicable, search terms used)

C. DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT

Category*	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
Y	US, A, 5,325,362 (AZIZ) 28 JUNE 1994, See Figs. 4-12	1-26
Y	US, A, 5,416,842 (AZIZ) 16 May 1995 See Figs. 3-11.	1-26
Y	US, A, 5,444,782 (ADAMS, JR. ET AL) 22 August 1995 See Cols. 9-11.	1-26
Y, P	US, A, 5,548,646 (AZIZ ET AL) 20 August 1996. See Figs. 6 and 12.	1-26
Y, P	US, A, 5,550,984 (GELB) 27 August 1996, See Fig. 1.	1-26



Further documents are listed in the continuation of Box C.



See patent family annex.

* Special categories of cited documents:	*T	later document published after the international filing date or priority date and not in conflict with the application but cited to understand the principle or theory underlying the invention
A document defining the general state of the art which is not considered to be of particular relevance	*X*	document of particular relevance; the claimed invention cannot be considered novel or cannot be considered to involve an inventive step when the document is taken alone
E earlier document published on or after the international filing date	*Y*	document of particular relevance; the claimed invention cannot be considered to involve an inventive step when the document is combined with one or more other such documents, such combination being obvious to a person skilled in the art
L document which may throw doubts on priority claim(s) or which is cited to establish the publication date of another citation or other special reason (as specified)	*G*	document member of the same patent family
O document referring to an oral disclosure, use, exhibition or other means		
P document published prior to the international filing date but later than the priority date claimed		

Date of the actual completion of the international search

29 APRIL 1997

Date of mailing of the international search report

09 JUN 1997

Name and mailing address of the ISA/US
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
Box PCT
Washington, D.C. 20231

Facsimile No. (703) 305-3230

Authorized officer

SALVATORE CANGIALOSI

Telephone No. (703) 305-1837

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

International application No.
PCT/US97/00666

A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER:
IPC (6):

H04L 9/00